You offer compelling evidence that, generally speaking, fragile states encourage R2P, at least on paper, and this should not be taken lightly. You suggest diplomatic approaches to engage R2P opponents, often “strong states,” in civilian protection.
Your concluding quote (by Gareth Evans) is also very compelling: “States that can’t or won’t stop internal atrocity crimes are the kind of rogue, or failed states or failing states, that can’t or won’t stop terrorism, weapons proliferation, the spread of health pandemics…and more global risks.”
Here is another, related, thought: The problems emanating from fragile states—including the mass atrocities and mass human rights abuses that the R2P framework focuses on—seem to share a core characteristic with other (diffuse) security threats to the globalized system, such as climate change, energy and water security, pandemics, illicit trafficking, slavery, you name it. An argument can be made that the shared core characteristic across these threats is a lack of a “gravitational center” for concerted strategic action, or, to put it bluntly, a centralized foreign enemy who very clearly threatens the territory, sovereignty, and values of one or more other sovereign state governments and societies.
The world is facing a collective action problem of enormous proportions. Truly mitigating, preventing, treating, and ending what are inherently distant, diffuse, and long-term threats means that rich and relatively peaceful countries start thinking of such threats as truly “strategic” and “immediate” in nature.
Reaction?
I like to think that both will and way are important. In other words, when there is a will, there is a way, and when there is a way, there is a will. These days you are based in Washington DC, and your work focuses on mass atrocities prevention. According to you, what’s the key tool to present policy makers with in order to empower them, to have them fully engaged with conflict prevention?
