More Settlements: Unawares Edition

Hi Marianna, good to virtually meet you! It's certainly an interesting question, and a tough one at that. But I think that given Netanyahu's demonstrated behavior, both in his first stint as PM as well as today, there's what he should do, and then there's what he will do. Most seem to agree that the major reason he failed as PM in the late 1990s was his simultaneous ability to project both arrogance and incompetence. He's a tremendously intelligent guy, and knows it, but the rigors of governance in the context of the Israeli political system brought out some interesting tendencies. For example, one of reasons why his coalition today is so unwieldy is because after last Feb's election, he tried to appease as many constituencies as possible in return for their initial support of a majority coalition. So in other words, he brought on board some truly incompetent people in prominent positions, solely so he could be PM. But the irony is that the PM has very little power if those around him in the coalition are incompetent, recalcitrant, or both. I spoke to someone not long ago who's pretty connected with Israeli politics, and he said that Netanyahu sees himself as the only one who can bring a resolution to the conflict (much in the same way the Nixon was the only one who could go to China). He thinks that the Israeli public has experimented with a few different leaders since his first reign as PM, and they eventually came back to him because they realized his worth to society. I suppose a deeper interpretation of that might go something like, "Netanyahu wants power and will do whatever it takes to maintain it." The first part of that is nothing remarkable, but the second part is where the problems begin. It's a sign of weak leadership. So I imagine that Netanyahu will continue to feel pressure on both of his flanks...and continue to give a head fake toward both camps in order to assuage some of their angst. And we've seen plenty of signs of this, including the latest 10 month settlement freeze. But will this actually result in any real action? You'll notice that there were plenty of exceptions built into this freeze, and 10 months isn't really much time to restart negotiations that, up until this recent announcement, were as bleak as they have been in a long time. I think he's making a risky bet -- that the Obama admin, under the weight of increased US public pressure coming from various angles, will eventually moderate its position and take its foot off the gas. For Netanyahu, that's a clear win, and it also solidifies his hold on power in Israeli politics. And just because he may see himself as the only one who can bring lasting peace, doesn't mean that he has any real incentive to do it from a political perspective. I guess we'll see how things unfold on that front. But as for what he should do? I guess that depends on what sort of result we want to see. For those who believe settlements are the biggest impediment toward a full-faith negotiation that produces results, he should risk the firestorm and declare a full and permanent freeze (which remember, has actually been agreed to before, and should by all standards of international law have happened long, long ago). The far right has plenty of power, but they aren't the largest part of his coalition. He also has Labor, and they would certainly stay on board and even increase their support. Even Kadima, who's currently in the opposition, would have to support such a move. The key may be providing him with a good enough incentive to make such an action. I'm not really sure what that might be, but it may be needed -- in the absence of violence, most Israelis don't really experience the consequences of occupation, so it becomes that much harder to whip up public pressure to make concessions. Anyway, sorry for the long response, definitely a complicated problem

You're right, in that many people refer to Gilo as a neighborhood rather than a settlement. This is a common rhetorical argument that often comes to define and ultimately derail the debate on this issue. But regardless of the term we assign to Gilo, the community lies beyond the Green Line in East Jerusalem, and would likely be within the border of a future Palestinian state should all parties come to a final agreement. This is significant because many feel that the presence, and expansion, of these communities is the single biggest obstacle toward sustained peace agreement. Certainly Palestinians have made it clear that they are reluctant to even begin a discussion until expansion is halted. They see it as a sign of whether or not Israel is negotiating in good faith, just as Israelis take Palestinian's willingness/unwillingness to completely and forever disassociate from violent orgs (and also arrest and prosecute those who do) as a sign that Palestinians are negotiating in good faith. But as to your other point -- this is also correct, but the Israeli government always as the power to enforce it's will, particularly on these sensitive and diplomatically explosive issues. Netanyahu's silence was essentially a tacit approval for Jerusalem's actions -- and remember, who did Obama send his envoy (Mitchell) to speak with immediately after the announcement of the expansion? It wasn't the Jerusalem municipality -- it was the Netanyahu government. So while you're right that the national government has no authority to approve municipal-level decisions, the nature of politics is such that Netanyahu can leverage the results he wants...if he wanted to.